Supreme Court of the State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 64973-1
Title of Case: State of Washington
v.
Ronald E. White
File Date: 07/16/98
Oral Argument Date: 10/15/97
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Superior Court,
Whatcom County;
94-1-00830-0
Honorable Michael F. Moynihan, Judge.
JUSTICES
--------
Authored by Charles W. Johnson
Concurring: James M. Dolliver
Charles Z. Smith
Richard P. Guy
Barbara A. Madsen
Philip A. Talmadge
Richard B. Sanders
Dissenting: Barbara Durham
Gerry L. Alexander
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
Starck M. Follis
Resick Hansen & Follis
412 N. Commercial St.
P.O. Box 5846
Bellingham, WA 98225
Counsel for Respondent(s)
David M. Grant
Whatcom County Assistant Pros. Atty.
Whatcom Co Courthouse
311 Grand Avenue
Bellingham, WA 98225
Laura D. Hayes
Whatcom County Prosecutor's Office
Whatcom County Pros Ofc
311 Grand Ave
Bellingham, WA 98225
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Sheriffs a
Leo E. Poort
Seattle Police Dpt Rm1000
610 Third Ave
Seattle, WA 98104-1824
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
)
Respondent, )
) No. 64973-1
v. )
) En Banc
RONALD E. WHITE, )
)
Petitioner. )
) Filed July 16, 1998
JOHNSON, J. -- We review the permissible scope of a warrantless
inventory search of a locked automobile trunk under article I, section 7 of
the Washington State Constitution. The search of a locked automobile trunk
was conducted during an impound proceeding following the arrest of the
Defendant. In 1980, this court held police may not search a locked
automobile trunk during an inventory search absent a manifest necessity,
not present here. State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 156, 622 P.2d 1218
(1980). The Court of Appeals focused on the accessibility of items in the
trunk to a "would-be thief" due to the vehicle's trunk release mechanism in
the glove box and held the search legal. State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770,
924 P.2d 55 (1996). We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold article I,
section 7 prohibits the warrantless search of the locked trunk of an
automobile.
FACTS
The Defendant, Ronald E. White, was stopped by police in Bellingham,
Washington for failing to stop at a stop sign. When questioned, White
wrongfully identified himself as "Dan White" and initially said he did not
own the car. The officer asked the Defendant for consent to search the
vehicle, which he refused. The officer asked the Defendant to exit the
vehicle and, despite the fact the officer stopped the Defendant for running
a stop sign, presented "Dan White" with a citation for driving with an
expired license only. The officer told the Defendant his vehicle would be
impounded under RCW 46.20.435,1 because the Defendant had an expired
driver's license, and inventoried under Bellingham Police Department
procedures.
The Defendant then admitted he was Ron White and told the police
officer he did not properly identify himself because of outstanding
warrants for his arrest. The officer ran a second Department of Motor
Vehicles search and discovered White's driving status had been revoked and
there were six outstanding warrants for the Defendant's arrest. The
officer arrested the Defendant for the outstanding warrants and for driving
while license revoked and placed the Defendant in the patrol car.
The police officer impounded the vehicle under RCW 46.20.435 because
(1) the driver was operating a vehicle with a revoked license; (2) the
officer was unsure of the true ownership of the vehicle; and (3) the
Defendant had many outstanding warrants for his arrest.
The inventory search was conducted in accordance with Bellingham
Police Department procedures which required police to search the trunk if
it could be opened by a key or a release latch. During this search, a
trunk release button was found in the unlocked glove box which opened the
locked trunk. In the trunk, officers searched an unlocked fishing tackle
box which, when opened, was found to contain drug paraphernalia, marijuana,
lighters, smoking devices, clear wrapped currency, and clear wrapped
cocaine.
The State charged White with unlawful possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver in violation of RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) and
driving while license suspended or revoked in violation of RCW 46.20.342.
At trial, White moved to suppress the items found in his trunk. He argued
the police had exceeded the scope of a lawful inventory search as set out
in Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143 by opening the locked trunk. The trial court
agreed, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the case. The Court of
Appeals reversed and held the search valid. White, 83 Wn. App. at 782. We
reverse.
ANALYSIS
In this case, the police conducted a warrantless inventory search of
the trunk of the Defendant's automobile. In Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, we
defined the permissible scope of an inventory search of an impounded
vehicle. While we said inventory searches conducted under standard police
procedures are reasonable, we stated "an inventory search may not be
unlimited in scope." Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 154. Concerned about the
possibility for abuse, we limited the scope of an inventory search "to
those areas necessary to fulfill its purpose." Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155.
After finding there was not an unreasonable risk of theft for property left
in the locked trunk of a vehicle, we explicitly held an officer may not
open and examine the locked trunk of an impounded vehicle during an
inventory search absent a manifest necessity for conducting the search.
Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 156.2 The State argues, and the Court of Appeals
agreed, the search was lawful in this case because access to the trunk was
obtained via a trunk release button located in the unlocked glove box.
Both suggest this release mechanism creates a situation distinguishable
from Houser; we disagree.
In this case, the Court of Appeals did not read Houser as establishing
a bright line rule prohibiting the police from searching a locked
automobile trunk. White, 83 Wn. App. at 778. Rather, the Court of Appeals
understood the analysis in Houser to focus on whether the potential for
theft of valuables and for false claims against the police department
justified the intrusion when the trunk could be opened from inside the
passenger compartment. White, 83 Wn. App at 779-80. The Court of Appeals
focused on the prevention of theft as described in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976), rather
than on the greater protection afforded to individuals under article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The Court of Appeals
misread the essential holding of Houser.
In Houser, we found police could search an unlocked glove compartment
of an abandoned automobile during an inventory search because documents of
ownership and registration are kept there and because the glove box is a
place of temporary storage of valuables. However, in Houser we limited the
scope of the search and stated:
We do not believe that it was necessary to enter the locked
trunk in order to serve these purposes. We note that the
inventory search which was approved in Opperman extended only to
the car's unlocked glove compartment. Moreover, property locked
in the trunk of an automobile, as here, presents no great danger
of theft. It is apparent that a would-be thief would be unaware
of the existence of property of value in the trunk. Indeed,
countless numbers of automobiles with locked trunks are daily
left on the city streets of this country without unreasonable
risk of theft. Accordingly, we think that any need to protect
property located in a locked trunk is outweighed by the
countervailing privacy interests of the individual in the
enclosed area of the trunk.
Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155-56 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).3 From this
language, our focus was primarily on the individual privacy interests and
not on the needs of police in avoiding claims, as the Court of Appeals
discussed. By focusing on individual privacy interests, our analysis in
Houser necessarily focused on the inquiry required by article I, section 7.
This is unlike the Fourth Amendment analysis the United States Supreme
Court used in Opperman.
The fact an automobile may have a trunk release mechanism does not
diminish an individual's privacy interests. Inside trunk latch releases
are merely a substitute for the use of a key to unlock the trunk. Whether
a locked trunk is opened by a key or a latch, it is still locked. The
privacy interests are the same. We hold the use of the trunk release
mechanism in this case is still the warrantless search of a locked trunk,
which brings this case squarely under the holding of Houser.
The Court of Appeals was correct in determining that Houser is
grounded in article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
White, 83 Wn. App. at 781-82. Article I, section 7 provides that "{n}o
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law." Under the Washington Constitution, the relevant
inquiry is whether the State unreasonably intruded into the Defendant's
private affairs. State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
The analysis under article I, section 7 focuses, not on a defendant's
actual or subjective expectation of privacy but, as we have previously
established, on those privacy interests Washington citizens held in the
past and are entitled to hold in the future. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 510-11.
The holding in Houser centered on the privacy interests of the individual;
accordingly, Houser is an article I, section 7 case.
The analysis in Houser is not unusual. We have often diverged from
the United States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisdiction, and we
have more narrowly defined the exceptions to the search warrant
requirements.4 We are once again confronted with the warrantless search of
an automobile. However, in this case we have an analytical advantage
because we know article I, section 7 provides more protection to
individuals from searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. Our
inquiry is no longer whether article I, section 7 provides greater
protection but, rather, does the scope of the protection apply to the facts
of the case.5 No Gunwall6 analysis is necessary in this case because we
apply established principles of state constitutional jurisprudence. We are
guided in this decision by those prior cases that have defined the fact
that article I, section 7 differs from the Fourth Amendment, at least in
the context of the specific legal issue presented here. Once we agree that
our prior cases direct the analysis to be employed in resolving the legal
issue, a Gunwall analysis is no longer helpful or necessary.7
Any analysis of article I, section 7 in Washington begins with the
proposition that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. State v.
Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). Despite this strict
rule, there are "`jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions" to the warrant
requirement. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d at 70 (quoting Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 149
(quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed.
2d 235 (1979))).8 An inventory search of an automobile was conducted by
police in this case. The three principal reasons for conducting an
inventory search are: (1) to protect the vehicle owner's property; (2) to
protect the police against false claims of theft by the owner;9 and (3) to
protect the police from potential danger. Houser, 95 Wn. 2d at 154. While
the validity of an inventory search is not at issue, the scope of such a
search is.
The general rule in Washington regarding the admissibility of evidence
discovered during an inventory search accompanying the impoundment of a
vehicle was set forth in State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571
(1968).
When . . . the facts indicate a lawful arrest, followed by
an inventory of the contents of the automobile preparatory to or
following the impoundment of the car, and there is found to be
reasonable and proper justification for such impoundment, and
where the search is not made as a general exploratory search for
the purpose of finding evidence of a crime but is made for the
justifiable purpose of finding, listing, and securing from loss,
during the arrested person's detention, property belonging to
him, then we have no hesitancy in declaring such inventory
reasonable and lawful, and evidence of crime found will not be
suppressed.
Montague, 73 Wn.2d at 385. Though the Montague court found inventory
searches valid, the court firmly stated that inventory searches must be
undertaken for lawful purposes.
{N}either would this court have any hesitancy in suppressing
evidence of crime found during the taking of the inventory, if we
found that either the arrest or the impoundment of the vehicle
was resorted to as a device and pretext for making a general
exploratory search of the car without a search warrant.
Montague, 73 Wn.2d at 385.
From the history of article I, section 7 and from the precedent
established in Montague, the rule enunciated in Houser emerged. Police are
not permitted to search the locked trunk of an impounded vehicle absent a
manifest necessity for so doing. Further, compliance with established
police procedures does not constitutionalize an illegal search and will not
enable the police to search a locked trunk without a warrant.10 While we
recognize inventory searches may serve legitimate government interests,
these interests are not limitless and do not outweigh the privacy interests
of Washington citizens.
In this case, the police searched a locked automobile trunk during an
inventory search. The police followed the Bellingham Police Department's
standard impound/inventory procedure directing the police to search the
trunk if access can be obtained by key or trunk release. Despite the Court
of Appeals attempt to justify the search on the grounds of accessibility to
a "would be thief," and the police department's reference to its
longstanding procedures, no manifest necessity was demonstrated. Simply
stated, the possibility of theft does not rise to the level of manifest
necessity.11 Houser established a bright line rule prohibiting the police
from intruding into an individual's privacy interests of a locked trunk
regardless of its accessibility. Whether a key is needed to unlock the
trunk or whether an interior release is used is of no distinction to the
privacy interests of the individual under article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution.
We do not address the impound issue or the search of the closed tackle
box because the permissible scope of an article I, section 7 inventory
search has been exceeded. We reaffirm Houser, which limits inventory
searches to the passenger compartment of a vehicle and does not include
locked trunks. We hold searches of closed and locked trunks are limited to
those few situations when manifest necessity exists.
The evidence is suppressed and the Court of Appeals reversed. We
agree with Judge Mary Kay Becker: "Houser is a simple, comprehensive and
workable decision. . . . it lacks neither in logic nor common sense."
White, 83 Wn. App. at 785 (Becker, J., dissenting).
WE CONCUR:
FOOTNOTES
1 RCW 46.20.435(1) (repealed by Laws of 1996, ch. 89, 3) provides:
"Upon determining that a person is operating a motor vehicle without a
valid driver's license in violation of RCW 46.20.021 or with a license that
has expired for ninety days or more, or with a suspended or revoked license
in violation of RCW 46.20.342 or 46.20.420, a law enforcement officer may
immediately impound the vehicle that the person is operating."
2 The State has not argued any manifest necessity exists in this case.
3 The State and amicus curiae, the Washington Association of Sheriffs and
Police Chiefs, both argue the Houser language relied upon by White and the
trial court is dicta. They are incorrect. "{W}here a decision rests on
two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter
dictum." Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S. Ct.
1235, 93 L. Ed. 1524 (1949). See also English v. United States, 42 F.3d
473, 485 (9th Cir. 1994); Russell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 678
F.2d 782, 785 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc. 54
F.3d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1995). In Houser, the decision to suppress the
evidence could rest on two rationales -- the illegality of the impound or
the illegality of the search. Simply because the unlawfulness of the
impound was analyzed first does not make the analysis of the inventory
search dicta.
4 See, e.g., State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)
(aerial surveillance of an open field), response to Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984); State v.
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (existence of probable
cause in relation to informant's tip), response to Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); State v. Chrisman, 100
Wn.2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (warrantless search of dormitory after
arrest for alcohol), response to Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102
S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1982); State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690,
674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (scope of warrantless search of automobile incident to
arrest), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720
P.2d 436 (1986), response to United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.
Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101
S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 108-09,
640 P.2d 1061 (1982) (application of exclusionary rule when right to
privacy unreasonably invaded), response to Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
31, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979); State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d
170, 177-78, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (automatic standing to challenge
seizure), response to United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct.
2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980).
5 See also State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 69 n.1, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).
6 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986).
7 A Gunwall analysis is nevertheless required in cases where the legal
principles are not firmly established, and certainly a Gunwall analysis is
helpful in determining the scope of the broader protections provided in
other contexts.
8 In Washington, the exceptions have fallen into six categories: (1)
consent; (2) exigent circumstances; (3) search incident to a valid arrest;
(4) inventory searches; (5) plain view; and (6) Terry investigative stops.
Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d at 71.
9 This stated purpose is articulated over and over as a valid justification
for an inventory search. However, its constant repetition has created a
justification without merit or the benefit of true legal analysis. When
the police impound a vehicle they become involuntary bailees. In such a
situation the police have the obligation to use only slight care for the
impounded vehicle and its contents. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 7.4(a) (3d ed. 1996).
10 "Unconstitutional searches cannot be constitutionalized by standardizing
them as a part of normal police practice." State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d
633, 640 (1976); see Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 154. But see Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 371-72; Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-74, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 739 (1987); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1990).
11 Further, the record does not indicate White was ever asked whether he
would consent to an inventory search, and the State makes no claim that he
was. White was never given the opportunity to reject the protection
available and, thus, the search is also suspect under State v. Williams,
102 Wn.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). In Williams, the court held police
may not conduct a routine inventory search following the lawful impoundment
of a vehicle without asking the owner, if present, if he or she will
consent to the search. Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 743; see also United States
v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1989) (decided on state grounds);
Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update,
11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411, 578 (1988). In Washington, an individual is
free to reject the protection that an inventory search provides and take
the chance that no loss will occur.
State v. White
Written by Johnson, J.
Dissent by Durham, C.J.
Dissent by Alexander, J.
No. 64973-1
ALEXANDER, J. (dissenting) -- Although I agree with the majority that
State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980), was grounded in
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, and thus disagree with
the Chief Justice in her assessment of the case as one based solely upon
the Fourth Amendment, I concur with the Chief Justice in the result that
she would have us reach. While I am satisfied that the contents of a
locked automobile trunk are protected by article I, section 7 from the
prying eyes of the police during a vehicle inventory search such as the one
here, in my view the defendant's car trunk could not be considered locked
under Houser because it could be opened merely by pressing a release button
in the passenger compartment to which the officers lawfully had access.
This "trunk release button was . . . in the unlocked glove box," Majority
op. at 4, and gaining access to the trunk by pressing this button was no
different than gaining access to the unlocked glove compartment itself by
pressing a button. If the release button for the trunk had been shielded
by a locked glove compartment, or was itself independently secured by a
lock, then it would have been protected by Houser and a different result
would be justified.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
State v. White (Ronald E.)
Majority by Johnson, J.
Dissent by Durham, C.J.
64973-1
DURHAM, C.J. (dissenting) -- The majority erroneously concludes that
State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980) was decided on state
constitutional grounds. Houser was decided solely on federal
constitutional grounds and the majority has no other support for the
proposition that inventory searches of vehicle trunks require separate
state constitutional analysis. Because the warrantless inventory search of
White's car was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, the seized evidence
should be admissible at trial. I, therefore, dissent.
I
The majority holds that the inventory search of White's car trunk was
impermissible under article I, section 7 of our state constitution based on
the conclusory assertion that Houser was decided on state constitutional
grounds. The starting and ending point of the majority's analysis on this
issue is the following assertion: "The holding in Houser centered on the
privacy interests of the individual; accordingly, Houser is an article I,
section 7 case." Majority at 9.
Although inartfully stated, the majority appears to suggest that
Houser was resolved on the "private affairs" concerns of article I, section
7. Unlike the federal "reasonable expectation of privacy" inquiry, the
state constitutional inquiry focuses on whether the State has unreasonably
intruded into a person's "private affairs." State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d
506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). In other contexts, this court has construed
the state constitution to provide broader protection than the federal
constitution because of the unique protection of a person's "private
affairs" under article I, section 7. E.g., State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173,
181, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 577-78, 800 P.2d
1112 (1990). However, unlike Young, Boland, or any of the other article I,
section 7 cases cited by the majority,1 Houser did not depart from federal
precedent based on textual differences between the state and federal
constitutions. Instead, Houser simply observed in the introduction of the
opinion that the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 define the scope
of permissible warrantless searches. Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 148. Despite
this passing reference to the state constitution, the court confined its
analysis solely to federal precedent and state Fourth Amendment cases in
holding that the inventory search at issue was unreasonable.2 This is not
surprising given that the court itself characterized the inventory search
issue as a "Fourth Amendment question." Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 156 n.4.
Even though Houser did not cite a single case decided on article I,
section 7 grounds, the majority attempts to shoehorn Houser into our
article I, section 7 jurisprudence based on the Houser court's weighing of
"privacy interests." The majority asserts that "{b}y focusing on
individual privacy interests, our analysis in Houser necessarily focused on
the inquiry required by article I, section 7." Majority at 8. Yet, the
majority has identified nothing unique here. Both the Fourth Amendment and
article I, section 7 focus on the State's intrusion into individual privacy
interests. Indeed, the Houser court weighed the individual privacy
interest against the State's interest in protecting the property in the
trunk because this was precisely the inquiry required by the court's
reliance on South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L.
E. 2d 1000 (1976) -- a federal search and seizure case. As Justice Powell
observed: "Against these {State} interests must be weighed the citizen's
interest in the privacy of the contents of his automobile." Opperman, 428
U.S. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring). Consequently, Houser's choice of
language -- "privacy interests" -- is wholly consonant with the court's
exclusive Fourth Amendment analysis.
The majority, thus, attempts to avoid the application of federal
precedent with the following syllogism: (1) we have granted broader state
constitutional protection because of the "private affairs" language of
article I, section 7; (2) the Houser court focused on individual "privacy
interests"; therefore, (3) Houser is an article I, section 7 case. The
obvious flaw in this logic is the disjuncture of the predicate assumptions.
The conclusion simply does not follow from the underlying premises. The
majority, therefore, is without any support for the proposition that we
have granted broader state constitutional protection in the context of
automobile inventory searches.
II
The Court of Appeals decision below correctly resolved that the
inventory search of White's car trunk was permissible under Houser's Fourth
Amendment analysis. The Houser court recognized the long standing
inventory exception to the warrant requirement when such a search is
performed in good faith to secure the impounded property from loss and to
protect the police against false claims of loss. Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 154.
The court observed that the inventory exception is limited to protecting
against substantial risks to property. Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155. Because
the court was convinced that property locked in the trunk of an automobile
was not at substantial risk, the underlying rationale to perform a
warrantless search did not exist. Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155-56.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals correctly distinguished
Houser based on the risk of loss to items in a trunk accessible only by key
versus the risk of loss to items in a trunk accessible merely by pushing a
button in the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
The risk of theft or unfounded claims becomes substantial when a
car's trunk can be opened from an easily-accessible area of the
passenger compartment. Implicit in the justification for
warrantless inventory searches of the passenger compartment,
including its unlocked glove compartment, is the recognition that
these are areas a would-be thief can easily get into. Logically,
if a thief can get into the passenger compartment of a vehicle,
he or she can get into the trunk just as easily if it can be
opened with a release button located in that same passenger
compartment. Because it is no great secret that some cars have
trunk release levers in the glove compartment or by the driver's
seat, the danger of theft of items left in the trunks of those
cars is far greater than is the case if a car trunk can only be
opened with a key.
State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 779, 924 P.2d 55 (1996). As the Court of
Appeals observed, the foregoing analysis is entirely consistent with
Opperman, which focused on the accessibility of the inventoried area.
White, 83 Wn. App. at 780 (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376 n.10).
Moreover, this analysis is consistent with subsequent Supreme Court
precedent. In Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed.
2d 739 (1987), the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol and his vehicle was impounded. In conducting an inventory
search of the vehicle, an officer discovered controlled substances in
closed containers he found in a closed backpack. The defendant moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that searching closed containers exceeded
the permissible scope of a warrantless inventory search under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court rejected this challenge, reiterating that inventory
searches are reasonable when conducted pursuant to standardized procedures
in order to secure property from loss or to protect the police from false
claims of loss.
In the present case, as in Opperman and Lafayette, there
was no showing that the police, who were following standardized
procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
investigation. In addition, the governmental interests
justifying the inventory searches in Opperman and Lafeyette are
nearly the same as those which obtain here. In each case, the
police were potentially responsible for the property taken into
their custody. By securing the property, the police protected
the property from unauthorized interference. Knowledge of the
precise nature of the property helped guard against claims of
theft, vandalism, or negligence.
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73.
There is nothing in this case to suggest that the Bremerton police did
anything other than search the easily accessible areas of White's car
pursuant to a standardized inventory policy to inventory those items at
risk of loss. The seized evidence should, therefore, be admissible.3 I
would affirm.
FOOTNOTES
1 Majority at 9 (citing State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d
151 (1984); State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136 (1984);
State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); State v.
Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled by State v.
Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 150, 720 P.2d 436 (1986); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d
92, 108-09, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 177-78,
622 P.2d 1199 (1980)).
2 State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 153-56, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980) (citing
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538
(1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1000 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed.
2d 706 (1973); United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Boster,
217 Kan. 618, 539 P.2d 294 (1975), overruled by State v. Fortune, 236 Kan.
248, 256, 689 P.2d 1196 (1984); State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633 (La. 1976);
State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974); State v. Montague, 73
Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Singleton, 9 Wn. App. 327, 511
P.2d 1396 (1973)).
3 The court need not consider whether the police exceeded the scope of
a permissible inventory search by opening White's unlocked tackle box
because White has never raised this issue. RAP 2.5(a), 13.7(b). Moreover,
White concedes that under Bertine and Opperman, police may search closed
containers discovered during an inventory search. Br. of Resp't at 21-22.