STATE OF ARIZONA
                          DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA,                  )         1 CA-CR 97-0673
          Appellee,                )         DEPARTMENT E 
v.                                 )
                                   )         O P I N I O N 
HOWARD JAMES CLARK,                )
                                   )         Filed 1-19-99
          Appellant.               )

        Appeal from the Superior Court of Maricopa County

                      Cause No. CR 96-12400

              The Honorable Alfred J. Rogers, Judge


             The Honorable Michael A. Yarnell, Judge



Janet A. Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General
  by Paul J. McMurdie, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section
     Colleen L. French, Assistant Attorney General          
Attorneys for Appellee                                    Phoenix

Dean W. Trebesch, Maricopa County Public Defender
  by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender   
Attorney for Appellant                                    Phoenix

Howard James Clark
  In Propria Persona                                     Florence

R Y A N, Judge

¶1        Howard James Clark appeals from his convictions and
sentences for one count of attempted first degree murder, a class
two, nonrepetitive, dangerous felony, and one count of aggravated
assault, a class three, nonrepetitive, dangerous felony.  Counsel
for Clark has filed a brief in compliance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297,
451 P.2d 878 (1969), stating that he has searched the record and
found no arguable question of law upon which an appeal can be
based.  Clark filed a supplemental brief in propria persona ("pro

¶2         Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
compliance with Anders requires counsel to set forth an arguable
issue or issues in the brief.  Robbins v. Smith, 152 F.3d 1062 (9th
Cir. 1998), amending 125 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1997).  Under Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing whether this court's procedure,
which does not require appointed counsel to allege arguable issues
if counsel determines none exist, complies with Anders in light of
the Robbins decision.  Counsel responded and we publish this
decision to guide appointed counsel in the preparation of an
indigent appellant's brief after counsel has determined there are
no arguable issues to the appeal.

¶3        Clark, almost sixty and legally blind, lived alone in a
trailer and conducted a mechanic's business.  As a result of his
blindness, numerous friends stopped by from time to time to assist
Clark with his daily tasks.  One of these friends introduced Clark
to M. L.  M. L. offered to stay with Clark to help him with his
problems and his business.  Clark accepted.

¶4        After M. L. had roomed with Clark for several weeks he
invited a friend, E. S., to visit him.  On the night of November
18, 1996, M. L., E. S., and several others had a party in Clark's
trailer.  Clark was visiting a friend that night and did not return
home until the early morning hours of the next day.

¶5        That next day, two of his neighbors, Nellie Saliva and
Michelle Parker, found E. S. behind the bar in Clark's trailer. 
Nellie and Michelle knew that Clark allowed no one behind the bar
because he kept his personal things there.  Suspicious, the pair
followed E. S. into Clark's bedroom.  There they saw that E. S. had
packed several of Clark's things into her duffel bag and seemed to
be preparing to leave.  Michelle told Clark, who confronted E. S.

¶6        E. S. insisted she was not attempting to steal anything. 
Clark became angry and threw a tape case at her, striking her. 
Upset, E. S. ran from the trailer.  Outside, M. L. was working on
one of the vehicles that Clark had accepted for repair.  E. S. ran
past M. L., who followed her to determine what was wrong. 

¶7        Clark then stepped out onto the porch of his trailer with
a pistol.  He yelled to M. L. to bring E. S. back so he could shoot
her.  Clark pointed the pistol in their direction.  M. L. told
Clark that he could not shoot because M. L. was in the way.  Clark
responded, "Fine, I'll shoot you."  Clark fired and the bullet
ricocheted off a nearby vehicle and struck M. L. in the back.

¶8        E. S. ran to a convenience market across from Clark's
trailer and called 911.  Eventually, M. L. also made it to the
convenience market.  The paramedics arrived and M. L. was taken to
the hospital.  He was treated and released the following morning.

¶9        In the meantime, Maricopa County deputy sheriffs had
arrived and contacted Clark.  Clark, now alone in his trailer,
denied shooting M. L. but refused to come out and talk with police. 
Clark told the police that he had a flamethrower and explosives in
the trailer and that he had a hostage.  The deputies did not know
if Clark was telling the truth, and a two-and-a-half hour stand-off
ensued.  Finally, Deputy David Head arrived and talked Clark into
surrendering.  The deputies never recovered the weapon used to
shoot M. L.

¶10       Clark was indicted on one count of attempted first degree
murder, one count of attempted second degree murder (later
withdrawn), and one count of aggravated assault.  At trial, M. L.
and E. S. testified that Clark had pointed a pistol at them and
fired, hitting M. L.  Both witnesses were certain that Clark was
the one that shot M. L.  In addition, the State presented evidence
that Clark made phone calls from jail to ask a friend to make E. S.
"disappear" before she could testify.  There was also evidence that
Clark offered to send M. L. to California at the time of trial to
prevent him from testifying.

¶11       Clark defended on the basis that a "Mexican man" had
actually shot M. L.  Clark claimed that the man was a friend of M.
L.'s who became upset when the drug deal they were transacting
turned sour.  Previously, on cross-examination, Clark's counsel had
brought out that M. L. had seven baggies of methamphetamine when he
was shot.  

¶12       The jury convicted Clark of the two charges.  The trial
court sentenced Clark to concurrent, presumptive terms of 10.5
years on the attempted murder charge and 7.5 years on the
aggravated assault charge.  Clark appeals.  We have jurisdiction
under article 6, section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona
Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21, 13-4031,
and 13-4033.   

¶13       We first discuss the question whether this court's
procedure for dealing with Anders appeals is constitutional in
light of the Robbins decision.  In Robbins, appointed counsel,
following the procedure approved by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979), filed a brief in the
California Court of Appeal "which briefly outlined the facts
surrounding Robbins's trial and failed to present any possible
grounds for appeal."  152 F.3d at 1064.  Counsel also asked the
court to review the record for arguable issues and promised to
remain available to address any issues found by the court.  Id. 
The Robbins court held that this procedure failed to comply with
Anders because counsel "completely failed to identify any grounds
that arguably supported an appeal."  Id. at 1067.  It thus affirmed
the federal district court's grant of habeas corpus relief.  Id. at

¶14       We think our court's procedure, much like the procedure
used in other jurisdictions, better appreciates appointed counsel's
ethical obligations while still providing indigent appellants their
constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal
protection.  We disagree with the Robbins decision and accordingly
decline to follow it.  See State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 543
n.2, 768 P.2d 1177, 1188 n.2 (1989) (declining to follow a Ninth
Circuit opinion holding Arizona's death penalty statute
unconstitutional because that opinion rested on "grounds on which
different courts may reasonably hold different views of what the
Constitution requires"). 

¶15       In Anders, the United States Supreme Court first
attempted to determine the extent of appointed appellate counsel's
duty to "prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction, after
that attorney has conscientiously determined that there is no merit
to the indigent's appeal."  386 U.S. at 739.  There, the
defendant's court-appointed lawyer, following California's
established procedures, wrote a letter advising the appellate court
that he had concluded his client's appeal had no merit.  Id.
Simultaneously, he advised that court that the defendant wished to
file a brief on his own behalf.  After reviewing the defendant's
brief and the record, the California appellate court affirmed the
conviction.  Id.  Subsequently, the defendant filed a habeas corpus
petition with the California Supreme Court.  The California Supreme
Court also affirmed defendant's conviction.  Id. at 740-41.  The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding:

          On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus some
          six years later [the court] found the appeal
          had no merit.  It failed, however, to say
          whether it was frivolous or not, but, after
          consideration, simply found the petition to be
          "without merit."  The [California] Supreme
          Court, in dismissing this habeas corpus
          application, gave no reason at all for its
          decision and so we do not know the basis for
          its action.  We cannot say that there was a
          finding of frivolity by either of the
          California courts or that counsel acted in any
          greater capacity than merely as amicus curiae
          . . . .  Hence California's procedure did not
          furnish petitioner with counsel acting in the
          role of an advocate nor did it provide that
          full consideration and resolution of the
          matter as is obtained when counsel is acting
          in that capacity.

Id. at 743.  The Court concluded that such an approach "does not
comport with fair procedure and lacks that equality that is
required by the Fourteenth Amendment."  Id. at 741. 

¶16       The Court then reviewed the line of cases dealing with an
indigent defendant's appellate rights.  See, e.g., Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (necessity of providing a
transcript for indigent defendants on appeal); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (appointment of counsel on
appeal).  Relying on the equal protection rationale of these
decisions, the Court described what is required of appointed
appellate counsel when counsel determines no serious basis for the
indigent's appeal exists:

               The constitutional requirement of
          substantial equality and fair process can only
          be attained where counsel acts in the role of
          an active advocate in behalf of his client, as
          opposed to that of amicus curiae.  The no-
          merit letter and the procedure it triggers do
          not reach that dignity.  Counsel should, and
          can with honor and without conflict, be of
          more assistance to his client and to the
          court.  His role as advocate requires that he
          support his client's appeal to the best of his
          ability.  Of course, if counsel finds his case
          to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
          examination of it, he should so advise the
          court and request permission to withdraw. 
          That request must, however, be accompanied by
          a brief referring to anything in the record
          that might arguably support the appeal.  A
          copy of counsel's brief should be furnished
          the indigent and time allowed him to raise any
          points that he chooses; the court -- not
          counsel -- then proceeds, after a full
          examination of all the proceedings, to decide
          whether the case is wholly frivolous.  If it
          so finds it may grant counsel's request to
          withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as
          federal requirements are concerned, or proceed
          to a decision on the merits, if state law so
          requires.  On the other hand, if it finds any
          of the legal points arguable on their merits
          (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior
          to decision, afford the indigent the
          assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.

               This requirement would not force
          appointed counsel to brief his case against
          his client but would merely afford the latter
          that advocacy which a non-indigent defendant
          is able to obtain.  It would also induce the
          court to pursue all the more vigorously its
          own review because of the ready references not
          only to the record, but also to the legal
          authorities as furnished it by counsel.  The
          no-merit letter, on the other hand, affords
          neither the client nor the court any aid.  The
          former must shift entirely for himself while
          the court has only the cold record which it
          must review without the help of an advocate. 
          Moreover, such handling would tend to protect
          counsel from the constantly increasing charge
          that he was ineffective and had not handled
          the case with that diligence to which an
          indigent defendant is entitled.  This
          procedure will assure penniless defendants the
          same rights and opportunities on appeal -- as
          nearly as is practicable -- as are enjoyed by
          those persons who are in a similar situation
          but who are able to afford the retention of
          private counsel.

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744-45 (footnote omitted).

¶17       Although Anders implicated a defendant's rights to due
process and counsel, the central principle that Anders sought to
vindicate was equal protection.  Thus, an indigent criminal
defendant and a non-indigent defendant must be afforded the same
basic means of presenting an appeal.  Those means necessarily
included an attorney to advocate on the defendant's behalf.

¶18       The Court reaffirmed Anders' equal protection rationale
in McCoy v. Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429 (1988).  In McCoy, appointed
counsel challenged a Wisconsin Supreme Court rule that required
counsel seeking to withdraw to submit a brief to the court that
included an explanation as to why issues that "'might arguably
support the appeal'" lacked merit.  Id. at 430 (citation omitted). 
In deciding the issue the Court stated:

               The principle of substantial equality . .
          . require[s] that appointed counsel make the
          same diligent and thorough evaluation of the
          case as a retained lawyer before concluding
          that an appeal is frivolous.  Every advocate
          has essentially the same professional
          responsibility whether he or she accepted a
          retainer from a paying client or an
          appointment from a court.  The appellate
          lawyer must master the trial record,
          thoroughly research the law, and exercise
          judgment in identifying the arguments that may
          be advanced on appeal.  In preparing and
          evaluating the case, and in advising the
          client as to the prospects for success,
          counsel must consistently serve the clientūs
          interest to the best of his or her ability. 
          Only after such an evaluation has led counsel
          to the conclusion that the appeal is "wholly
          frivolous" is counsel justified in making a
          motion to withdraw.

Id. at 438-39 (footnote omitted).

¶19       The Court additionally noted that the "Anders brief is
designed to assure the court that the indigent defendant's
constitutional rights have not been violated."   Id. at 442.  The
Court continued:

          To satisfy federal constitutional concerns, an
          appellate court faces two interrelated tasks
          as it rules on counsel's motion to withdraw. 
          First, it must satisfy itself that the
          attorney has provided the client with a
          diligent and thorough search of the record for
          any arguable claim that might support the
          client's appeal.  Second, it must determine
          whether counsel has correctly concluded that
          the appeal is frivolous.  

Id.  This language implicated the indigent's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.  The Court sought to make certain that an indigent
appellant's right to equal protection had substance; thus, it
required appellate courts to use the Anders procedure to ensure
that appointed counsel effectively performed requisite legal
duties.  Because the Wisconsin rule facilitated the appellate
court's determination on counsel's adequacy and did not violate the
defendant's constitutional rights, the Court upheld the rule.

¶20       The Court reiterated an indigent defendant's right to
effective counsel on appeal in Penson, 488 U.S. at 75.  In Penson,
after the indigent petitioner and two co-defendants were found
guilty of crimes in an Ohio state court, appellate counsel filed a
document captioned "Certification of Meritless Appeal and Motion in
the Ohio Court of Appeals."  Id. at 77.  The certificate indicated
that counsel had carefully reviewed the record and found no errors
requiring reversal.  He also requested leave to withdraw.  Id. at

¶21       The Ohio appellate court granted the motion to withdraw
and specified that the court would independently review the record
to determine whether any reversible error existed.  Id.  After
examining the record, the Ohio appellate court found that counsel's
certification of meritlessness was "'highly questionable'" and that
"'several arguable claims'" existed.  Id. at 79 (citations
omitted).  In fact, it reversed one of petitioner's convictions for
plain error.  However, the court concluded that petitioner suffered
no prejudice as a result of counsel's performance because the court
had thoroughly examined the record.  The court affirmed
petitioner's remaining convictions and the Ohio Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal.  Id.

¶22       On review, the United States Supreme Court held that the
petitioner was deprived of equal protection and the right to
counsel because the procedures used in Penson's case failed to
comply with the constitutional requirements set forth in Anders. 
First, appointed counsel's motion did not identify anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal.  Id. at 81.  Second,
the Ohio appellate court ruled on the motion to withdraw before
making its own examination of the case to determine if counsel had
correctly determined the appeal was frivolous. Id. at 82-83.  These
errors prevented the Anders brief from achieving its purpose.  The
Court again explained that the two functions of the Anders brief
were to provide an appellate court with a basis for determining
whether appointed counsel had performed his duty to support his
client's appeal to the best of his ability, and to help the
appellate court make its own determination that the appeal was
indeed frivolous.  Id. at 81-82.

¶23        The Court also stated that the Ohio court erred by
failing to appoint new counsel after it had determined that several
arguable claims capable of supporting the appeal existed.  Id. at
83.  Because our system of justice is premised on adversarial
presentation, a defendant's right to counsel can be vindicated only
by an active advocate on his behalf.  Id. at 84-85.  The Court,
therefore, concluded that an appellate court's review would not
suffice to protect the indigent's constitutional rights when its
review uncovered an "arguable" issue.  Id. at 86-87. 

¶24       Taken together, Anders, McCoy, and Penson set forth the 
constitutional minimums to ensure indigent defendants their rights
to counsel, equal protection, and due process when counsel
determines that no meritorious issues exist to appeal.  The Anders
line of decisions outlines a procedure that must be followed to
ensure compliance with these minimum constitutional standards. 
Under this procedure, appointed counsel will not be permitted to
withdraw unless counsel first files a brief that indicates to the
appellate court that counsel has diligently attempted to find an
arguable issue for the defendant.  The appellate court then reviews
the record to ensure counsel's diligence.  If the court finds an
arguable issue, it must direct counsel to assist the defendant in
presenting this argument.  Only if it finds no arguable issue may
the court permit the indigent's appointed counsel to withdraw.

¶25       Unfortunately, Anders' guarantee of equal and effective
counsel has created a fundamental conflict between compliance with
the Constitution's requirements and appointed counsel's ethical
obligations.  Simply stated, if counsel has concluded that the
appeal is "wholly frivolous," counsel has also necessarily
concluded that nothing in the record exists that might "arguably
support" the appeal.  If counsel must file a brief after
determining that the appeal has no merit, that brief may ultimately
be a brief against the client.   By filing a "no-merit" brief,
counsel is put in the uncomfortable, possibly unethical position of
arguing against the client's interests.

¶26       The issue then becomes what exactly counsel must do to
satisfy the constitutional requirements of Anders without running
afoul of ethical obligations to the court and the defendant. 
Different jurisdictions have developed various approaches to
resolve this problem.  See generally, Martha C. Warner, Anders in
the Fifty States: Some Appellants' Equal Protection is More Equal
Than Others', 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625, 669-87 (1996).

¶27       Several of the federal circuits require literal
compliance, that is, a brief with pertinent cites to legal
authority raising any "arguable" issues--notwithstanding counsel's
ethical obligations.  See, e.g., Robbins, 152 F.3d at 1067; United
States v. Pippen, 115 F.3d 422, 426 (7th Cir. 1997) (the brief must
identify, with record references and legal citations, possible
grounds for error along with an argument for reversal and the
reason why such an argument would be frivolous); United States v.
Zuluaga, 981 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1992) (brief must include
references to the record and citations to legal authorities).  Some
states have adopted this logic as well and have rules explicitly
detailing what is required in Anders briefs.  See Warner, supra, at
653 nn.223 & 224; (citing Ark. R. App. P. 4-3(j); Del. Sup. Ct. R.
26(c); Iowa R. App. P. 104; Mich. Ct. R. 7.211(c)(5); R. Okla. Ct. Crim.
App. 3.6(B)). 

¶28       Other states do not permit appointed counsel to withdraw
from representing indigents on appeal, but require counsel to brief
the case on the merits.  See, e.g., State v. McKenney, 568 P.2d
1213, 1214-15 (Idaho 1977); Commonwealth v. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d
585, 590-91 (Mass. 1981).  However, in some of the states that do
not permit counsel to withdraw, courts allow counsel to file a
brief containing only the factual and procedural background of the
case without raising frivolous issues.  See, e.g, Wende, 600 P.2d
at 1075; State v. Balfour, 814 P.2d 1069, 1079-80 (Or. 1991). 
Finally, a number of states have abandoned the Anders procedure
altogether.  See  Warner, supra, at 651 (noting that Anders briefs
are not filed in Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, and

¶29       This variety of approaches reveals an underlying tension
in the Anders procedure.  While the Supreme Court has the authority
to determine constitutional issues, it is up to the states to
determine the proper ethical rules for attorneys practicing within
their jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (recognizing that states have compelling
interest in regulating the practice of law in their courts). 
Indeed, the continued survival of the various approaches suggests
that the Supreme Court recognizes that there is more than one
acceptable way to resolve the conflict between counsel's ethical
obligations and an indigent defendant's right to effective
appellate representation.  Thus, as long as a jurisdiction affords
indigent defendants their rights to counsel, equal protection, and
due process, it may determine the proper ethical course for
appointed appellate counsel who conclude that only frivolous issues
exist on appeal.  Within this authority, we believe this court's
approach satisfactorily reconciles Anders' constitutional concerns
with counsel's ethical obligations.

¶30       Under our procedure, when appointed counsel determines
that a defendant's case discloses no arguable issues for appeal,
counsel files an Anders brief.  The brief contains a detailed
factual and procedural history of the case, with citations to the
record.  See Scott, 187 Ariz. at 478 n.4, 930 P.2d at 555 n.4. 
Counsel submits the brief to the court and the defendant.  The
defendant is then given the opportunity to file a brief pro per. 
After receiving all briefing, the court reviews the entire record
for reversible error.  If any arguable issue presents itself, the
court directs appointed counsel to brief the issue.  Only after the
court has ascertained that counsel has conscientiously performed
his or her duty to review the record, and has itself reviewed the
record for reversible error and found none, will the court allow
counsel to withdraw.  See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85,
684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984).  We conclude that this procedure
permits counsel to perform ethically, while simultaneously ensuring
that an indigent defendant's constitutional rights to due process,
equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel are

¶31       We believe our procedure is appropriate for two reasons. 
First, the procedure does not run afoul of appointed counsel's
ethical obligations.  Under Arizona's ethical rules, a lawyer may
not assert frivolous claims or defenses.  See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42
(professional conduct), Ethical Rule ("ER") 3.1 (meritorious claims
and contentions); see also ER 3.3 (candor to the tribunal). 
Literal compliance with Anders' command to raise all arguable
issues, notwithstanding their merit, would cause appellate counsel
to violate his or her ethical obligations.  See ER 1.16(a) ("[A]
lawyer shall . . . withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct . . . .").  For this reason, we do not require
the brief to contain non-meritorious arguments.  Moreover,
requiring the brief to contain non-meritorious arguments, together
with citation to legal authority indicating why such arguments are
frivolous, would negatively affect appointed counsel's
relationship with the defendant.  The client might not believe that
counsel behaved as a zealous advocate on behalf of the client if
counsel's brief contained reasons for the appellate court to affirm
the client's conviction. 

¶32       Second, our procedure adequately protects the indigent
defendant's rights to counsel, equal protection, and due process
established by Anders, McCoy, and Penson.  By requiring counsel to
file an Anders brief setting forth a detailed factual and
procedural history of the case with citations to the record, this
court can satisfy itself that counsel has in fact thoroughly
reviewed the record.  This requirement assures that appointed
counsel has diligently provided substantially equal representation
to the indigent defendant.  In addition, these citations to the
record assist the court in determining whether counsel correctly
concluded that the appeal is indeed frivolous.

¶33       Requiring a detailed history with the appropriate
citations for appellate review fulfills the two functions of Penson
(demonstrating that counsel has thoroughly reviewed the record and
that the appeal is so frivolous that it may be decided without
further adversarial presentation), 488 U.S. at 81-82, while
avoiding the ethical dilemma of briefing the case against the
defendant.  Cf. Balfour, 814 P.2d at 1079-80 (holding that brief
containing only a statement of the case, with a statement of the
facts, was sufficient to protect an indigent defendant's rights to
counsel and equal protection, where counsel is not permitted to
withdraw).  Thus, our procedure assures adequate representation,
yet still provides the adversarial presentation mandated by Penson
if an arguable issue is found by the court.  See 488 U.S. at 84.

¶34       In addition, under our procedure, counsel cannot withdraw
until after the court of appeals has conducted its review. 
Shattuck, 140 Ariz. at 584-85, 684 P.2d at 156-57.  If the court
finds an arguable issue, it will order appointed counsel to brief
the issue. 

¶35       Moreover, if the defendant perceives that counsel has not
effectively assisted in the presentation of his appeal, the
defendant may petition for post-conviction relief under our rules. 
See State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz. 642, 905 P.2d 1377 (App. 1995)
(holding that an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel is encompassed within Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 as a claim that
the conviction or sentence was in violation of the federal or state
constitution).  This procedure provides additional scrutiny of
appointed counsel's and the court's determination that the appeal
is frivolous.

¶36       As previously noted, the court itself reviews the record
for reversible error.  This review gives the indigent appellant at
least one, and as many as four, additional lawyers searching the
record for error.  We believe this extensive review assists in
protecting an indigent defendant's rights to equal protection and
due process.

¶37       Finally, we note that the appellate structure we have
"provides the indigent appellant with at least the same rights that
an appellant with the funds to hire counsel would have, i.e., an
advocate on the appellant's behalf active to the permissible
ethical limit."  Balfour, 814 P.2d at 1081.  Our procedure complies
with Anders' constitutional requirements by requiring appointed
counsel to perform his or her functions in a conscientious, ethical
and diligent manner.  Moreover, this court's review both assures
counsel's compliance with these constitutional standards and
provides the indigent defendant with an exhaustive search of the
record for error.

¶38       We thus conclude that our procedure protects an indigent
appellant's rights to counsel, equal protection, and due process --
Anders requires no more.  Accordingly, we decline to follow

¶39       In his pro per brief, Clark raises several issues on
appeal.  First, Clark claims that the arraignment judge told him he
was guilty and that this prejudiced him.  Second, Clark asserts
that the victims only testified under duress from the police. 
Third, Clark complains that Detective Sears implied to the grand
jury that Clark could actually see, that he was a "good actor." 
Fourth, Clark claims that the court erred by admitting only a part
of his conversation with the sheriff's office dispatcher.  Fifth,
Clark argues that the trial court violated his speedy trial rights
when it forced him to proceed with current counsel rather than
allowing him to proceed with new counsel or in pro per.  Finally,
Clark complains that he has not received enough assistance from the
prison to meet his special needs in preparing his appeal.

¶40       After reviewing the record, we find that it does not
support Clark's first two arguments.  First, no evidence supports
that the arraignment judge told Clark he was guilty, nor that
prejudice resulted from such a statement.  Second, no evidence
exists to show the police coerced any of the State's witnesses. 
Thus, neither of these arguments supplies an adequate basis for
reversing the jury's verdicts.

¶41       Clark's third argument asserts that the grand jury would
not have indicted him if Detective Sears had testified truthfully
regarding Clark's inability to see.  We cannot review a defendant's
claim that the grand jury did not have probable cause to indict him
following a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v.
Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 507, 892 P.2d 838, 843 (1995); State v.
Charo, 156 Ariz. 561, 566, 754 P.2d 288, 293 (1988).  In any event,
Detective Sears testified to the grand jury that Clark was legally

¶42       Clark's fourth argument, that the trial court erroneously
admitted only a portion of his conversation with the sheriff's
office dispatcher, similarly lacks merit.  The trial court heard
the entire tape during argument on Clark's motion for a new trial
and did not believe the evidence warranted a new trial.  Clark's
rationale for asking for the excluded portions of the tape was that
it corroborated Clark's testimony that he never admitted shooting
M. L.  However, other witnesses at trial corroborated Clark's
testimony on this point, including Sergeant Watsak, the officer
talking to Clark during the stand-off.  Clark was not deprived of
his ability to fairly and effectively present his case by the
admission of only portions of the tape.

¶43       Clark's fifth argument is that the trial court violated
his speedy trial rights.  Before trial, defense counsel and the
State jointly requested a continuance to enable them to more
effectively prepare their cases.  The court asked Clark if he would
agree to waive the requested extension of time for speedy trial
purposes.  Clark refused.  Clark demanded an immediate trial and
offered to handle the case pro per, or alternatively, wanted
different counsel appointed so he could have an immediate trial. 

¶44       We review a trial court's decision granting a continuance
to allow counsel adequate time to prepare a case for an abuse of
discretion.  State v. McWilliams, 103 Ariz. 500, 501-02, 446 P.2d
229, 230-31 (1968); State v. LeVar, 98 Ariz. 217, 220-21, 403 P.2d
532, 535 (1965).  "When defense counsel states that he is not
adequately or fully prepared on the eve of trial, where the lack of
preparation is not due to an absence of diligence on his part, a
trial judge does not err in continuing the matter."  State v.
Smith, 146 Ariz. 325, 326-27, 705 P.2d 1376, 1377-78 (App. 1985). 
This result does not change even if the defendant insists on an
immediate trial.  Id. at 327, 705 P.2d at 1378.  Thus, we will
affirm a trial court's decision granting a continuance, despite a
defendant's insistence on an immediate trial, when the facts
indicate that defense counsel needs more time to prepare and no
evidence exists of a lack of diligence by counsel.

¶45       The trial court granted the joint motion for a
continuance and denied Clark's motion to proceed pro per or to
retain new counsel.  The court stated that defense counsel was "an
experienced and very competent attorney in these matters," and
found that the continuance was justified by "extraordinary
circumstances and in the interest of justice."  It further stated:

          I have carefully weighed the issue of the
          defendant's desire to go to trial immediately
          -- though his desire to go to trial
          immediately or represent himself or have
          counsel is all inconsistent with an immediate
          trial -- and the defendant's constitutional
          right to at least adequate representation by
          counsel.  I find specifically representation
          by counsel is more important in this case than
          trying the case precipitously, either with or
          without counsel.  

Thus, the trial court determined that defense counsel had
adequately represented the defendant but that he needed more time
to effectively prepare his case.  Accordingly, it did not abuse its
discretion by granting the joint motion for a continuance or
denying Clark's motion for new counsel.

¶46       Finally, Clark claims that the prison denied him the
assistance he needed to adequately prepare his supplemental brief. 
Specifically, Clark complains that due to his blindness he is
entitled to have recordings of the entire trial or have someone
read the transcripts to him; additionally, he requests that he be
allowed to communicate with the court via tape recorded statements.

¶47       The Constitution requires that a prisoner be provided
meaningful access to the courts.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350
(1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 828 (1977).  A
prisoner's right of access includes a right to have the transcripts
of his trial made available to him.  Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.  It
also includes the right to access a law library or have legal
assistance provided, but only as a means for ensuring "'a
reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of
fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'" Lewis, 518 U.S.
at 351 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825).  In other words, a
prisoner must demonstrate not only a denial of meaningful access
but also that the denial has actually injured his ability to
present a meritorious argument to the court.  Id.

¶48       The record does not support Clark's contention that he
has been denied meaningful access to the court.  First, Clark
received copies of the transcripts of his trial.  Second, since his
counsel's Anders brief was filed on February 17, 1998, Clark has
filed four documents, including one in which he asked to have
considered as his supplemental brief, with this court.  These
documents reference legal authority and indicate his familiarity
with the record.  Far from indicating a denial of meaningful
access, these pleadings reveal that the prison is providing Clark
ample opportunity and assistance to pursue his appeal.  Finally, in
recognition of Clark's blindness, we granted Clark two extensions
of time to file his brief.  Thus, from this record, Clark has been
given meaningful access to the court.

¶49       In addition, Clark has not indicated an actual injury
resulting from his alleged denial of access to the court.  To show
actual injury, Clark must demonstrate that the denial prevented him
from asserting some legitimately appealable issue.  Id.  He cannot
do so.  Appointed counsel filed an Anders appeal on his behalf. 
Clark himself filed a supplemental brief.  We have considered and
addressed his arguments.  Also, we have reviewed the record for
reversible error and have found none.  Clark cannot show any injury
from his alleged denial of access to the court.  

¶50       In summary, we conclude that our procedure for deciding
non-meritorious appeals fully complies with the requirements of
Anders.  Thus we decline to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Robbins.  We have also thoroughly reviewed the record and find no
reversible error.  The record shows that Clark was represented by
counsel at all stages of the proceedings and on appeal, and that
the trial court afforded Clark all of his rights under the
constitution, our statutes, and the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure.  The evidence supports the jury's verdict, and the
sentence imposed falls within the range prescribed by law.

¶51       Upon the filing of this decision, counsel's obligations
pertaining to the representation of Clark in this appeal have come
to an end.  Counsel need do no more than inform Clark of the status
of his appeal and of his future options, unless counsel's review
reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme
Court by petition for review.  See Shattuck, 140 Ariz. at 584-85,
684 P.2d at 156-57.  Clark shall have thirty days from the date of
this decision in which to proceed, if he desires, with a pro per
motion for reconsideration or petition for review. 

¶52       We affirm Clark's convictions and sentences.

                                MICHAEL D. RYAN, Presiding Judge